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Introduction
International environmental agreements are second best institutions. They can improve on unilateralism, but usually fall short of sustaining full cooperation. Climate change is a particularly difficult challenge. Because the marginal costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions increase sharply, at least beyond some point, the incentives to free ride are substantial-and impossible for an international environmental agreement to overcome using the usual mechanism of reciprocity. This is why other strategies need to be considered. A few papers have shown that, under certain circumstances, a technology-oriented strategy can help. Heal (1994) shows that cooperation can be facilitated when abatement costs are interdependent. Golombek and Hoel (2004) show that R&D spillovers may cause new technologies to be diffused globally-producing a kind of negative leakage. I have shown that R&D directed at technologies exhibiting strong network externalities can transform the problem of deterring free riding (Barrett 2006) . Finally, Hoel and de Zeeuw (2009) show that cooperation in R&D can increase global abatement by reducing the costs of adopting a new technology. In this paper I explore a different perspective. This is to consider two technologies that lower atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases in very different ways-a conventional abatement technology that reduces emissions at increasing marginal cost and a novel technology that reduces atmospheric concentrations directly by removing CO 2 from the air. This novel technology, known generically as "air capture," has a constant but very high marginal cost.
3
There are a number of ways to remove CO 2 from the air (Barrett 2009 ). Several approaches exploit the process of photosynthesis. Credits for afforestation and reforestation are already incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol (avoided deforestation, the subject of ongoing negotiations, would limit additions to atmospheric concentrations). A related approach is to use biomass as a fuel for electricity generation, and then to capture and store the CO 2 from combustion, resulting in negative net emissions. Another idea is to fertilize iron-limited regions of the oceans, to stimulate the growth of phytoplankton, which, if they sink to the deep ocean, will cause the surface waters to extract CO 2 from the air to restore chemical balance. Unfortunately, the effects of all these biological approaches are difficult to verify, limited in scale, and prone to having worrying side effects.
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In this paper I consider "industrial" air capture. This involves a technology that brings air into contact with a chemical "sorbent" (an alkaline liquid). The sorbent absorbs CO 2 in the air, and the industrial process then separates out the CO 2 , recycles the sorbent, and stores the captured CO 2 in geologic deposits, just like CO 2 removed from a power plant's stack gases. Industrial air capture has several desirable features (Sarewitz and Nelson 2008) . It would be decoupled from our energy systems, and could be located near geologic sites for long-term carbon storage and away from population areas, where land has a low opportunity cost. It could also be scaled to any level. Conceivably, every other 1 Ocean fertilization is perhaps the most worrying of these proposals. In 2007, the 84 parties to the London Convention/Protocol endorsed a "statement of concern" about ocean fertilization, and urged parties "to use the utmost caution when considering proposals for large-scale ocean fertilization aspect of the global economy could remain unaltered, and this technology be used to sustain virtually any desired reduction in atmospheric levels of carbon. From the perspective of emission reductions, industrial air capture is a true "backstop technology." Industrial air capture is expensive. Estimates of marginal cost range from $100-$200/tCO 2 . Industrial air capture is much more costly than the alternatives for reducing emissions, including power plant CO 2 capture and storage. Its marginal costs also exceed current estimates of the social cost of carbon, which range from about $7-$85/tCO 2 .
However, the marginal cost of industrial air capture is lower than estimates of the cost of meeting a 2˚ C temperature change target by means of abatement technology by around 2100. 2 In the future, use of industrial air capture may be collectively optimal.
Though costly, industrial air capture has offsetting advantages. Because it acts directly on reducing concentrations, industrial air capture offers more options for the timing of investment as compared with emission reductions (Pielke 2007 As is usual, we solve the game backwards.
Since the equilibrium of the earlier abatement game, q i = b c , is in dominant strategies, it must also be the equilibrium of the stage 3 game. Letting k q denote the number of signatories to the abatement-only agreement, collective maximization by signatories implies that each signatory must play q s = bk q c in stage 2. Finally, letting π s and π n denote the payoff to a signatory and non-signatory, respectively, a Nash equilibrium of the stage 1 game is a participation level k q country i plays z i = 0 . If γ > bN , then this equilibrium will also be first best. Let us assume, however, that γ < bN (this, as noted previously, is a situation in which we might find ourselves in the future). Then the above Nash equilibrium will be inefficient.
Can a treaty help? Let us see. In stage 3, non-signatories will plainly play z n = 0 . In stage 2, signatories will play z s = z if bk z ≥ γ and z s = 0 otherwise, where k z denotes the number of parties to the air-capture-only treaty. Finally, in equilibrium, the number of signatories will be k z
Note that, while the equilibrium number of signatories to an air capture protocol can be large, when this number is large the overall gains to cooperation will be small. As with an 8 abatement-only treaty, an air-capture-only treaty can improve little on the noncooperative outcome (though, as we shall see, unlike an abatement-only treaty, an aircapture-only treaty may come close to sustaining full cooperation).
A combined protocol
I have so far modeled abatement and air capture as independent choices. But the equilibrium levels of marginal cost vary substantially as between the two agreements. In the equilibrium abatement protocol, marginal cost is 3b. In the equilibrium air capture protocol, marginal cost is γ . As explained previously, it is very likely that γ >> 3b .
This means that, if abatement and air capture are addressed in separate protocols, mitigation will not be cost-effective.
It seems more plausible to assume that cooperating countries would want to negotiate a single agreement, with the decisions to abate and carry out air capture being optimized jointly. How might such a treaty be designed?
Because marginal benefits are assumed to be constant, the first order conditions for both abatement and air capture will be unchanged as compared with the previous analyses.
Non-signatories will play q n = b c and z n = 0 . Signatories will play q s = k + b c , where k + denotes the number of parties to the combined protocol; they will play z s = z for k + ≥ γ b and z s = 0 for k + < γ b . Of course, the non-cooperative and full cooperative outcomes will also be unchanged as compared with the earlier analyses.
While these conditions will remain unchanged, the treaty equilibria may be very different. So long as γ >> 3b , there will exist one treaty equilibrium in which parties to the agreement only abate their emissions. In this equilibrium, each of the k q * = 3 signatories will undertake three times the abatement as each non-signatory, and each nonsignatory will undertake the same level of abatement as in the non-cooperative outcome.
No country will undertake air capture in this equilibrium (again, assuming γ >> 3b ).
If bN > γ there may also exist a treaty equilibrium at
cannot be sure that an agreement comprising this number of parties will be self-enforcing.
The reason is that, in a combined protocol, the countries investing in air capture must undertake abatement at the same marginal cost, and we know that such a high level of abatement cannot be sustained by an abatement-only agreement-the incentives to free ride are too great. For this second equilibrium to exist, therefore, the returns to air capture must be large enough to offset the returns lost by foregoing free riding.
> γ b to be an equilibrium in a combined treaty we must have
That is, we require
This condition will clearly be satisfied.
We also require
which reduces to
This second condition may or may not be satisfied. It is more likely to be satisfied if c and z are "large" and γ is "small" (the effect of b is ambiguous).
The value of k that maximizes the LHS of (1) is k = cz b + 2 . Substituting this value into (1) yields
This condition is necessary for an agreement with k parties (where k is the smallest integer greater than γ b ) to be self-enforcing. Solving the quadratic in (1), this same value of k must lie between k and k , where
For a combined treaty comprising k + * countries to be self-enforcing, with k + * being equal to the smallest integer greater than γ b , we must have
Even though the model is very simple, I have been unable to obtain an analytical solution for the equilibrium, combined treaty. Table 1 presents simulations from which several conclusions follow:
1. An abatement-only treaty improves little over the non-cooperative outcome. The
simulations thus confirm what we already knew.
2. The possibility of air capture can increase payoffs dramatically provided z is "large" or c is "large." If z is "large," the trigger for air capture (k being larger than γ / b ) reduces concentrations dramatically, delivering a substantial benefit to every country. If c is "large" very little abatement is done, with or without an abatement-only treaty, and air capture can therefore make a substantial difference to the overall level of mitigation.
3. As illustrated by Simulation I, a combined (and, therefore, cost-effective) protocol may not be self-enforcing. Put differently, an insistence on cost-effectiveness may cause air capture not to be used, even though every country would be better off if it were used in a separate treaty, part of a package of cost-ineffective mitigation arrangements. This result makes an important point: that cost-effectiveness may not be a feature of a second-best treaty arrangement; that a focus on costeffectiveness could actually reduce welfare all around.
Comparison of Simulations I and II reveals that a combined protocol is more
likely to be self-enforcing if the capacity for air capture, z , is "large." This, of course, is because the gains to adding air capture to an abatement treaty must be large enough to overcome the incentive to free ride in abatement. 7. Finally, comparison of Simulations IV and V shows that a higher marginal benefit to mitigation, b, also lowers the participation level in a self-enforcing, combined treaty (this is because the trigger for air capture is k ≥ γ / b ). Ironically, a higher marginal benefit shrinks the payoff to combining air capture and abatement.
In a combined treaty, air capture provides a vehicle for raising the participation level among countries that cooperate to reduce their emissions. However, this helps (in percentage terms) a lot only for Simulation IV, and in this case there is a wide gap (again, in percentage terms) between the aggregate payoff for a combined protocol and the full cooperative outcome.
I have so far emphasized the overall advantages and disadvantages of negotiating a combined treaty. What are the implications for individual countries? Table 2 summarizes the payoffs to individual countries for the simulations in Table 1 . Two perspectives are important. The first is the perspective countries might take to negotiating a combined treaty after the abatement-only and air-capture-only treaties have been realized. The second is the perspective countries might take to combining treaties before any treaty has been developed. In the latter case, countries have a symmetric perspective on the decision to combine. In the former case, they do not. Table 2 shows that, if the decision to negotiate separate or combined treaties is made in a preliminary stage, the perspective of every country will be identical, and the decision to negotiate separate treaties or a combined treaty will be unanimous. If the parameter values correspond to Simulation I, every country will prefer to negotiate separate treaties.
They will eschew possibilities for cost-effectiveness. If the parameter values correspond to Simulations II-V, every country will prefer to negotiate a combined treaty in which abatement and air capture are cost-effective. were to be sequestered in silicate minerals, then this constraint would be eased (though at an additional cost).
Let us then consider a situation in which the amount of air capture undertaken overall is constrained, such that
Then, k z * will again be the smallest integer greater than or equal to γ b . However, the level of air capture undertaken for this k will now be Z rather than k z * z (these values could, by chance, be equal). In this case, changes in the equilibrium participation level, k z * , will not change the amount of air capture undertaken in an air-capture-only treaty. In contrast to the previous analysis, the amount of air capture undertaken will be efficient. What will change, as participation changes, is the arrangement for cost sharing.
When air capture is undertaken as a single project, the variable z i is best thought of as a financing share. That is, for k z ≥ γ / b , each party to the treaty contributes an amount γ z i , with γ z i i ∑ = γ Z . In this model, countries are symmetric, and so the only plausible compatible, I assume that aggregate capacity is identical; that is, I take it that Z = zN . In comparing Tables 1 and 3 , we can see that mitigation levels and payoffs are higher when air capture can be undertaken as a single project. In percentage terms, the difference is particularly noticeable for Simulations IV and V. In these cases, a relatively small number of countries deploy air capture in a self-enforcing treaty. For the simulations in Table 1 , these countries undertake relatively little air capture, since the maximum amount per country is fixed. For the simulations in Table 3 , these countries undertake a lot more, since only the total amount of air capture is fixed.
Conclusions
The literature on international environmental agreements has tended to put technology is a "black box." However, an emerging literature shows that technologies may have features that affect the incentives for countries to cooperate, and the design of selfenforcing-treaties. This paper extends this body of research. Starting from the canonical model of cooperation in reducing emissions, I allow countries to employ a "backstop technology," either in a separate treaty or a combined treaty. For climate change, this backstop technology is industrial "air capture."
The model developed here offers three important insights. First, while economists have overwhelmingly favored cost-effective treaty designs, this paper shows that there are situations in which separate treaties pertaining to different technologies may be superior overall, even though the resulting mitigation is not cost-effective. Second, where a 
